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We begin at the beginning, with an outline of Aristotle’s views on ontology and with a discussion of the 
influence of these views on Linnaeus. We move from there to consider the data standardization initiatives 
launched in the 19th century, and then turn to investigate how the idea of computational ontologies 
developed in the AI and knowledge representation communities in the closing decades of the 20th century. 
We show how aspects of this idea, particularly those relating to the use of the term 'concept' in ontology 
development, influenced SNOMED CT and other medical terminologies. Against this background we then 
show how the Foundational Model of Anatomy, the Gene Ontology, Basic Formal Ontology and other OBO 
Foundry ontologies came into existence and discuss their role in the development of contemporary 
biomedical informatics.Keywords: biomedical ontology, Aristotle, Linnaeus, SNOMED CT, Foundational 
Model of Anatomy, Gene Ontology, Basic Formal Ontology 
1 From Aristotle to Linnaeus 
The term ‘ontology’ (ontologia) is a neologism, coined in the 17th century as an alternative to the Greek 
‘metaphysics’, referring to the branch of philosophy that is engaged in the study of what exists or of ‘what 
it is to be’ in the most general sense.  An ontology in the modern sense – which includes the biomedical 
ontologies discussed in what follows – is a taxonomy-like artifact that is structured in such a way as to be 
useful not only to humans but also to computers. The connection between the two senses of ‘ontology’ 
turns on the fact that the foundation of any taxonomy is the idea of what is general, and this idea lies at 
the center of both ancient metaphysics and contemporary ontology. 
We are all implicitly familiar with the idea of what is general through our use of general terms (nouns and 
noun phrases) in both everyday and scientific contexts. In a tradition which goes back to Plato and 
Aristotle, such general terms are said to refer to universals, where each universal is associated with the 
collection of those particulars in reality which are its instances.1  
A universal, sometimes also called a kind or type, is in some sense that which all its instances have in 
common. Aristotle held that we acquire knowledge of universals by observing the particulars that 
instantiate them. He himself displayed a lifelong interest in descriptive biology, and his metaphysics is 
 
1 ‘Particular’ means: an entity that exists in some unique region of space and time. Where universals are repeatable in 






rooted in his experience of the world as a place populated by instances of universals in the biological 
domain (Grene 1963, Lennox 1984, Leroi, 2014). Science, from Aristotle’s point of view – which he saw 
as ‘natural philosophy’ – is thereby focused on what is qualitative in nature, which is to say on describing 
of how specific instances of universals such as human or bird are at specific times running or sitting or 
perspiring or rotting.  
The process of mathematicization of science initiated by Galileo has of course diminished the attraction 
of qualitative, descriptive views of science of the sort embraced by Aristotle. But elements of such views 
still survive today, not least in the world of biomedicine. Even the idea that we gain knowledge of 
universals by examining their instances in reality is still very much a part of science. This is because the 
terms scientists use in formulating scientific laws are precisely terms representing universals. Laws link 
universals. And we gain knowledge of such laws by performing experiments in which we engage with the 
instances of the universals linked. 
1.1 Science and common sense 
Aristotle himself studied anatomy, astronomy, embryology, geography, geology, meteorology, physics 
and zoology.2 His starting point for exploring such domains scientifically consists in establishing what 
kinds of entities they contain, thus in mapping the corresponding domain universals. This implies also 
creating a terminology consisting of the general terms with which to represent those universals. 
Understanding ‘what it is to be’ for the entities in a domain means to acquire knowledge of what the 
particulars instantiating any given universal in that domain have in common.   
Aristotle assumed that human beings are in harmony with the world we find around us in the sense that, 
when we observe reality, we are able to grasp in our minds the universals instantiated by the things we 
see and touch.  He does not seek deeper theories of what lies ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ appearances, because 
to seek such theories would be to assume that the world is not as it appears to be. Certainly, there is room 
for error on the Aristotelian view. This relates, however, to particular perceptions only; it leaves the 
general features of perceptual knowledge untouched. Thus the Aristotelian – like the commonsensical – 
way of thinking about the world  
 
2 He also wrote on aesthetics, ethics, logic, metaphysics, government, politics, economics, psychology, rhetoric and theology 
(Sallam 2010). In his article on Aristotle’s biology in the Stanford Encycopledia of Philosophy, Lennox (2021) reports that in 
1837 the anatomist Richard Owen ‘introduced a survey of Aristotle’s zoological studies ‘by declaring that “Zoological 
Science sprang from [Aristotle’s] labours, we may almost say, like Minerva from the Head of Jove, in a state of noble and 






will never concede that it is false throughout. Error is a local phenomenon, it does not distort our entire 
outlook. Modern science, on the other hand (and the Platonic and Democritian philosophies it absorbed) 
postulated just such global distortions. (Feyerabend 1978, p. 148) 
We return to this way of thinking in section 4.1, when we investigate the idea of a canonical ontology 
and thereby explore the reasons why biomedical ontologies have evolved in such a way as to include 
elements deriving both from Aristotelian thinking and from modern, data-driven science. 
1.2 Aristotle on definitions 
The treatises compiled by Aristotle’s students and promulgated in his name constitute a virtual 
encyclopedia of Greek knowledge. Typically, each treatise begins with a review of earlier contributions 
to the study of the relevant domain and then presents Aristotle’s own view with the aid of definitions of 
one or more central terms. Book II of the Physics, for example, begins with the definition of ‘nature’; Book 
II of On the Soul with the definition of ‘soul’.  
The term ‘definition’ is used in a variety of ways in the Aristotelian corpus, but the core of his account 
rests on the idea that there is a hierarchy (or multiple hierarchies) of more and less general universals, with 
each universal in the hierarchy relating as species to its genus (in other words to its immediate parent in 
the hierarchy). A species is then defined by stipulating what is specific about the instances of its genus 
which makes them instances of the species. 
The way this works is illustrated Figure 1, which is based on the tree-form representation of universals 
attributed to Porphyry, the author of an influential introduction to Aristotle’s Categories from the 3rd 
century (see Barnes, ed. 2006), which was also the standard textbook in logic for at least a millennium 
























At the apex of the tree is the universal Substance, which divides into the branches of Material and 
Immaterial. The former is then divided into Living and Non-Living, and Living Substance is divided 
further into the Sentient and the Non-Sentient. Sentient Substance, finally, is divided into the Rational and 
the Irrational, which then provides the means to define a Human Being as a Rational Sentient Living 
Material Substance or – taking advantage of the way in which definitions at lower levels incorporate 
logically the contents of definitions at higher levels – that a Human Being is a Rational Animal.3 This 
feature of incorporation allows successively ever more complex thoughts to be expressed by means of 
expressions that remain relatively compact at each stage. It is exploited in mathematics and in all the 
sciences to enable human beings to deploy ever more complex ideas in still understandable ways. 
We can now understand why the Aristotelian rule for creating definitions is referred to by Aristotle’s 
interpreters as definition per genus et differentiam. What this means is that a definition of a species consists 
of two parts specifying, respectively, its genus, and an associated specific difference. The instances of the 
species that is being defined are then all and only those instances of the genus that satisfy the specific 
difference. We shall return to this rule for formulating definitions in section 4.3 below. 
1.3 Aristotle’s table of categories  
Aristotle created a number of more or less fragmentary examples of what we would nowadays call domain 
 
3 In Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, we find a definition of human being as ‘animal, mortal, footed, biped, wingless’ (92al-2) 
and alternatively as ‘animal, tame, biped’ (96b31); in Metaphysics Z ‘biped’ and ‘animal’ are said to ‘constitute the definition 
of man’ (1038a3). In his Politics (1.1253a) Aristotle’s defines an animal of the human kind as a zoon politikon, or in other 






ontologies. At the same time he worked also on creating a top-level ontology, which would bind those 
domain ontologies together within a single logically and ontologically coherent framework by providing 
a common starting point – a common set of highest genera – for the definitions of their respective terms. 
The treatise compiled by Aristotle’s students under the title Metaphysics addresses issues arising at this 
highest level of generality. 
Aristotle’s ideas on such matters are, as we shall see, still of considerable influence today. But he was of 
course not the only philosopher in the ancient world to have developed an influential approach to 
metaphysics. His competitors in this respect included his own teacher Plato, who conceived universals as 
inhabiting a timeless, ideal world, remote from the world of things we encounter in our everyday 
experience. They included also Democritus, who propagated the doctrine according to which all that exists 
are ‘atoms and the void’; and Heraclitus, who embraced a process philosophy according to which 
‘everything is flux’. In the battle of grand theories, however, it is clear that Aristotle was – at least until 
the 17th century – the overwhelming victor. This was in part a result of the fact that Aristotelian 
metaphysics formed the foundations of Christian theology. But it also reflects the relative faithfulness of 
many of Aristotle’s ideas, when compared with those embraced by his competitors, to much of what is 
accepted by common sense: that human beings (for example) exist, that they grow and develop through 
time, that they have qualities, habits, dispositions of various sorts, stand to each in various relations, 
occupy places, and so forth. 
As will already be clear, one main starting point of Aristotle’s metaphysics is the term ‘substance’. At 
Metaphysics 1030b6–12, for example, he asserts that ‘a proper definition states the essence of an entity, 
by which is meant “substance”’. It would be a difficult task to provide here an account of what Aristotle 
understood by this term. Suffice it to state here that in almost all the contexts where he provides examples 
of substances he refers to organisms (in particular to humans and horses).  
Substance is in Aristotle’s terminology one of the categories, which means that it is one of those most 
general universals which go to form his top-level ontology. They are what we call ‘primitives’ in virtue 
of the fact that they cannot be defined by the method of genus and specific difference because, lying at the 
very top, they lack a genus.  
In some places Aristotle suggests that substance is the only category. There is, however, another strain in 
Aristotle’s thinking according to which there are multiple universals on this highest level. First is the 






every case as a matter of necessity. What this means is that if a being is, for example, a horse at any time 
in its existence, then it is a horse at all times in its existence.  
Second is a collection of accident categories, which are those highest-level universals which hold of their 
bearer not essentially but as a matter of accident. This means that they can be gained and lost during the 
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Aristotle presents different versions of his list of categories. Figure 2 presents the version described at 
Cat., 2a34-35, 2b3-5, 2b15-17 in which, along with substance, nine accident categories are distinguished, 
examples for each of which are (from Cat., 1b25-2a4): 
Position: is lying, is sitting  
Action: cutting, burning 
Time: yesterday, last year 
Quality: white, grammatical 
Relation: double, half, larger 






Passion: being cut, being burned Quantity: four foot, five foot Place: in the Lyceum, in the market-place 
This table should not be seen as being complete. Further categories can be added to make more explicit. 
the categorical structure of the world. Indeed, as Jansen (2007) points out, the project presented by 
Aristotle in the Categories, ‘seems to be rather a working report on an ongoing research project than 
something ultimate and completed.’ One candidate additional category might be that of hole, an entity 
which can potentially be occupied or filled by something material, as for example a womb may be 
occupied by a fetus, or a trench be filled with water. In his treatise On the parts of animals Aristotle refers 
to the esophagus as ‘the channel through which food is conveyed to the stomach’ (III, 3). At the same time 
he refers to it as being ‘of a flesh-like character’. It is then the flesh-like entity, rather than the channel, 
which forms a part in the sense relevant to this treatise. This turns on the fact that Aristotle’s system of 
categories has no room for places or locations which are not occupied, nor for channels, or cavities,  or 
voids – or, more generally, for holes which are not filled (see Casati and Varzi 1994 and 4.2 below).  
The table of categories in Figure 1 may be extended also by recognizing universals in addition to those 
which have particulars as their instances. On some views, for example, there can be higher-level 
universals, which themselves have universals at lower levels as their instances. One example of such a 
higher-level universal would be the universal universal (Botti Benevides et al. 2019).  
1.4 Linnaeus’s Scala Naturæ and Genera Morborum 
We can imagine Aristotle’s ten categories as forming the top of a much larger hierarchy formed by 
universals belonging to successively more specific orders of being at lower levels. This idea was 
elaborated in the doctrines of the Scala Naturæ created by medieval philosophers, where each kind of 
entity is slotted into its own proper place in what is seen as a Great Chain of Being. This in turn formed 
one starting point for what we understand today as the tree of life, first systematically documented in 
Linnaeus’s Systema Naturæ, the title of the 10th edition of which is:  
System of nature through the three kingdoms of nature, according to classes, orders, genera and 
species, with characters, differences, synonyms, places. 
Here the ‘three kingdoms‘ are minerals, plants and animals. In his Genera Morborum, Linnaeus applied 
this taxonomical method to the realm of diseases, distinguishing eleven classes, thirty-seven orders, and 
three hundred and twenty-five species of human disease, a small selection of which is presented in Figure 










For some 2,000 years after its basic ideas were first set forth by Aristotle and his early commentators, the 
discipline of metaphysics advanced hardly at all, to the degree that it formed the central part of what was 
habitually referred to as philosophia perennis. The preeminent role of (Aristotelian) metaphysics in the 
pantheon of philosophical disciplines began to be challenged, however, from around the time of Descartes 
and Kant, who awarded pride of place to epistemology, which deals not with being but rather with 
knowledge. At the same time the preeminent role of philosophy itself among the disciplines was 












































During the 18th century, physics, in particular, evolved from its status as a qualitative and primarily 
descriptive discipline to become a quantitative and by degrees predictive discipline rooted in the 
mathematics-based study of observational and experimental results. This led, however, to an increasingly 
more urgent practical need for a standardized terminology for the communication of such results in a way 
that would allow international scientific and technological collaboration. Initiatives to address this need 
culminated in 1875 with the ratification of the Metre Convention, a landmark treaty which created the 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM). This led in turn to the SI international standard 
system of units, which has served since 1960 as the universally accepted specification of the units of 
measure for physical quantities. 
The SI standard incorporates controlled vocabularies not only for the representation of the physical units 
of measure but also for the kinds (universals) of physical magnitudes for whose measurement these units 
are employed. Both units and the corresponding magnitudes are divided into two classes of base and 
derived (see Figure 4), where the latter are defined in terms of the former. Force, for example, is defined 
as mass times acceleration, and a newton, the unit of force, is defined as the force needed to accelerate 
one kilogram of mass at the rate of one metre per second squared in the direction of the force applied.4 
 
4 New definitions of the base units were proposed in (BIPM 2019). Johansson points out in his (2021) that these new 
definitions appear to be circular, given that symbols for what is to be defined appear also in the defining expressions. He is 
indeed able to show that there are substantially non-circular definitions underneath these circularities, but he also identifies 









The success of the SI system is one important reason why the need for ontology has made itself felt hardly 
at all in the domain of physics. But there is a second, and no less important reason, which turns on the fact 
that the kinds of entities and relationships with which physics is concerned are rigorously defined using 
mathematical equations.5 The language of mathematics thereby serves in the physical domain as the lingua 
franca for the communication of scientific knowledge. These two factors together effectively ensure the 
mutual exploitability of both theories and results across all physical subdisciplines and all application 
areas, a feature of the physical domain that has shown itself to be indispensable to the success of all 
modern technology. 
Similar advances in standardization of language and taxonomy were made also in chemistry, beginning 
with Mendeleev’s Periodic Table in 1869 and culminating in the work of the International Union of Pure 
and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). The latter has defined rules for naming and classifying organic and 
inorganic compounds and created thereby a similar level of mutual exploitability of chemical knowledge 
across all chemical disciplines, both pure and applied. Comparable advances in biological standardization 
in the wake of Linnaeus were primarily in the anatomical domain, with the Nomina Anatomica, dating 
from 1895, replaced by the Terminologia Anatomica in 1998, though it was clear already in 2001 that the 
latter left much to be desired from the perspective of the new, information-driven approaches in medical 
science (Rosse 2001). 
 
5 Less well defined are the terms used to represent both the different types of magnitude and the ontological relations between 
(a) these magnitudes themselves, (b) the symbols appearing in mathematical equations, and (c) the measurement results 





















2 Ontology, logic and artificial intelligence 
2.1 Ontological commitment  
Before moving to the special case of biomedical ontologies, and to the revolution in the handling of 
biomedical data which has come in the wake of the human and other ‘model organism’ genome projects, 
we need to take account of the rise of ontology in the computer science disciplines which occurred in the 
closing decades of the last century. The beginnings of this episode in the history of ontology can be traced 
to the 1948 paper “On what there is” by the prominent philosopher-logician Willard Van Orman Quine. 
This paper advances a new conception of the proper method of ontology, which at the same time gave 
new respectability to the term ‘ontology’ itself, not least through its influence on the work of John 
McCarthy, creator of the term ‘artificial intelligence’. 
According to Quine, the ontologist’s task is to establish not what there is but rather what are the kinds of 
entities to which scientists are committed in their theorizing. The ontologist studies the world, on this 
conception, by drawing conclusions from the theories developed in the natural sciences.  
Each natural science has its own preferred repertoire of entities to the existence of which it is committed, 
a repertoire which is revealed in its vocabulary. In applying his method for identifying ontological 
commitments, however, Quine turns not to the controlled vocabularies for physics or chemistry 
established by organizations such as the BIPM or IUPAC. Rather, he looks instead to a fictional future 
state of science, in which scientific theories would have been subjected to a quite different sort of 
regimentation, resting not on consistency in the use of terms but rather on the formalization of scientific 
propositions using the language of First-Order Logic (FOL).  
2.2 First-order logic (FOL) 
FOL is the logical framework of choice that is used by philosophers and others in the formalization of 
many different sorts of theories. It grew out of the attempts by Frege – the founder of modern logic – and 
then by Whitehead, Russell and others, to use logic to formalize the whole of mathematics. Building on 
the success of this work, Rudolf Carnap and other members of the Vienna circle conceived the project of 
a ‘unified science’ (Neurath, Carnap and Morris 1938-1968), based – in one version at least – on the idea 
of a FOL-based axiomatization of all scientific theories. In his The Logical Structure of the World (1928), 
Carnap used logic as a vehicle for the design of ‘linguistic frameworks supplying all of the (names for) 






The use of FOL brings great benefits, including: 
 It allows us to capture in a single formal system many features of our reasoning not only in science 
and mathematics but also in our everyday affairs. 
 It has a mature and sophisticated model-based semantics, which is used in all contemporary 
ontology applications.  
 It exists in a number of semantically equivalent varieties of standardized syntax optimized for 
specific uses, including computational use in support of ontologies (ISO/IEC 24707, 2018). 
When it comes to computer applications, however, FOL has the shortcoming that it is not decidable, which 
means there is no effective procedure for determining, given a consistent set T of FOL formulas – which 
might, for example, be the set of axioms of an ontology – whether an additional FOL formula A can be 
added to T in such a way as to preserve consistency, As we shall see in 2.5, it was the attempt to rectify 
this shortcoming which led to the development of OWL, the Web Ontology Language. 
2.3  Ontological commitment again 
At the heart of FOL is the idea of quantified statements, for example of the form ∃xPx and yQy, which 
mean, respectively: some value of the variable x satisfies the predicate P, and: every value of the variable 
y satisfies the predicate Q. Thus ‘∃’ stands for ‘for some’, and ‘’ for ‘for all’. 
To determine the ontological commitments of a scientific theory formalized in FOL, on Quine’s approach, 
means to determine which entities belong to the ranges of those variables over which the formulas of the 
theory quantify – an idea that is captured in Quine’s maxim: ‘To be is the value of a variable’.  
Imagine, for example, that we wish to formalize in FOL the sentence:  
(1) Teco is a bonobo, 
as part of the evidence base for a scientific theory. A typical FOL rendering of this sentence is: 
(2) ∃x(is-a-bonobo(x) & x = Teco), 
Or, translated back into English: 






It is here Teco alone which is the value of a variable in either (2) or (3). This means that it is to Teco 
alone that we are ontologically committed in making either of these assertions. 
But could we not reformulate (1) in such a way that, say, bonobohood, would serve as value of a 
variable, for example by writing: 
(4) ∃P(instantiates(P, Teco) & P = bonobohood)? 
The problem here is that (4) is standardly interpreted as belonging not to first- but rather to higher-order 
logic, which is defined precisely by the fact that it allows quantification over predicates.6 Quine’s use of 
FOL to determine ontological commitment thus leads to an ontology in which only particulars exist – in 
other words to a nominalist doctrine, according to which particulars belong to the realm of what exists, 
but generals (universals) belong only to the realm of what can be said.  
For Aristotle, in contrast, as for his successors in the camp of what we shall henceforth call ‘ontological 
realism’ (Smith and Ceusters 2010), there is in addition to Teco a second something that exists, and that 
contributes to making true the sentence ‘Teco is a bonobo’, namely some feature or way of being, some 
species or natural kind to which Teco belongs, or some structure or pattern of DNA in Teco’s genome. 
From the ontologically realist perspective (1) then asserts a relation between Teco and this second 
something. 
2.4 The Vienna circle project to unify science 
In a series of groundbreaking contributions around the turn of the last century, Frege and others 
demonstrated that at least a large portion of mathematics could be unified by showing that the 
corresponding mathematical truths are ultimately truths of logic. The Vienna circle project was much less 
successful (Dahms 2018). But its underlying idea was influential nonetheless, above all through its effect 
on the work of John McCarthy and others in the field of artificial intelligence.  
McCarthy was a leading figure in the first, logicist or ‘symbolic’ (also called Good Old Fashioned AI or 
‘GOFAI’7) wave of AI research, contributing inter alia to that strand in GOFAI which sought to use FOL-
based approaches (including modal logic, the situation calculus, and so on) in order to capture in a formal 
 
6 Serious problems, such as Russell’s paradox (Moore 1988), arise in a logic which allows unrestricted quantification over 
predicates. Smith (2005) describes a simple paradox-free alternative (non-standard) FOL reading of sentences like (4), which 
involves quantification not over predicates but over universals. 






way information about the world, for example to support the building of an intelligent robot programmed 
with the ontology of common sense that is used by humans. 
It was in this context that McCarthy recognized the overlap between work done in philosophical ontology 
and the activity of building logical theories for AI systems. McCarthy affirmed already in 1980 that 
builders of logic-based intelligent systems must first ‘list everything that exists, building an ontology of 
our world’ (McCarthy 1980). This view, inspired by McCarthy’s reading of Quine8, was advanced also 
by McCarthy’s collaborator Patrick Hayes in his “Naive physics: ontology for liquids” (1978), the first 
work to use in its title the word ‘ontology’ in the new sense of the term that is aligned to the use of 
computers.  
As Hayes writes, looking back on the question of early uses of ontology in AI: 
As far as I recall, my use in the title of the 1978 paper was original. I used it deliberately to suggest/imply 
that the KR problem in AI was connected with philosophical ontology. The background to this was my 
reading Carnap’s Logical Structure of the World as an undergraduate, probably some time in 1964. Reading 
this blew my mind and first got me excited about the idea of using logic to describe the real world. When I 
got into AI and read McCarthy’s “Situations, actions and causal laws” … I was immediately struck by the 
similarity both of goals and even in places of formal (what would now be called ‘ontological’) techniques. 
(Hayes 2013) 
2.5 The Web Ontology Language (OWL) 
The sort of ontology practiced by Hayes was of considerable influence, as is illustrated for example in the 
Hobbs and Moore collection entitled Formal theories of the commonsense world published in 1985. But 
work of this sort in AI has of course has been eclipsed in recent years by an approach centered around 
deep neural networks and related stochastic approaches.9 In the world outside AI, however, the work of 
McCarthy and Hayes was just one initial strand in the burgeoning of work in ontology and knowledge 
representation (or ‘KR’) that took place from the 1980s onwards, in a movement which received 
considerable further impetus from the  release, in 1999, of Protégé 1.0, a freely available software tool for 
 
8 To quote from McCarthy (2000): ‘In philosophy, ontology is the branch that studies what things exist. W.V.O. Quine’s 
view is that the ontology is what the variables range over. Ontology has been used variously in AI, but I think Quine’s usage 
is best for AI.’  
9 Something like GOFAI may be enjoying a mild reawakening, for example, in the recent book on general AI by Marcus and 
Davis (2019), where a logic-based framework of common-sense AI is seen as a possible avenue to allow the gluing together 






the building of ontologies (and applied not least in the biomedical realm).  
At about this time, the drive to find a computationally tractable language for the purpose of developing 
formal ontologies led to the exploration of subsets of FOL especially in the family of so-called Description 
Logics (Baader et al. 2008). This culminated in the standardization by the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) of the Web Ontology Language or ‘OWL’ in 2004, which is currently the most widely used logical 
framework for ontology development (https://www.w3.org/OWL/).  
The new ontology languages were optimized for computer use, though unfortunately this came at the price 
of sacrifices in expressiveness (Schulz et al. 2009, Ceusters and Smith 2003). One result of the new ease 
with which ontologies could be built led accordingly to an upswell of overlapping and often mutually 
inconsistent efforts, as different groups sought in different ways to overcome the barriers of low 
expressivity. The results are illustrated for example by the way in which the fashion for agent-based 
modelling around the turn of the millennium led to the development of some 30 ‘agent ontologies’, under 
headings such as action, actions, activity, agent, agents, agent architecture, agent communication, agent 
framework, and so forth.10  
Many in the KR community seem to have assumed that the development of many, many ontologies is 
something positive. It is necessary only that each of the ontologies developed should be associated in the 
minds of its developers with some potential use case – an idea promulgated for example by Noy and 
McGuinness in their influential ontology manual (2001), for example in their assertion that ‘Deciding 
whether a particular concept is a class in an ontology or an individual instance depends on what the 
potential applications of the ontology are.’  
The multiplication of ontologies derived also from the fact that, during the period in question grant funding 
was available for the development only of novel ontologies. Efforts to establish the sorts of principles of 
best practice that might point ontology in a more scientific direction were, on the other hand, neglected(. 
Ontology development in this period, not surprisingly, gained a bad reputation – the results, it was said, 
were ‘brittle’, ‘unsustainable’, ‘unscalable’, and rested on over-simplified (and thus often unscientific) 
models of the relevant subject-matters. 
 
 
10 These are listed in the catalog of ontologies developed using DAML, the DARPA Agent Markup Language, 






3 The concept orientation 
The idea that we should seek to focus on the development of well-grounded reference ontologies was 
rejected, in many circles, since it was taken to imply that the authors of such ontologies would aspire to 
the possession of some kind of God’s eye perspective. Since such a perspective is unavailable, it was 
assumed that the best we can achieve is ontologies based on the ontological commitments of specific 
languages, theories, systems of beliefs, or what we shall encounter below as ‘conceptualizations’. 
The discipline of knowledge representation has to deal, after all, not with reality, but rather with the 
knowledge (and thus the concepts) in people’s minds. It is thus very likely to lead to the situation in which 
there is a plurality of ontologies covering the same topic, since there is plurality of knowers whose 
knowledge is being captured and a plurality of uses to which this knowledge is being put.  
KR researches who invested in trying to develop more generally applicable methodologies focused their 
efforts especially on approaches to ontology development based on model-theoretic semantics, making 
important contributions not least to the development of the ideas underlying OWL (Baader et al. 2008). 
There, too, however, there often reigned a presupposition to the effect that we can never understand what 
a given language or theory is really about – thus we can never compare an ontology to any independent 
reality beyond. We can, though, build abstract (set-theoretic) models, which we can usefully manipulate, 
for example in checking the consistency of a set of definitions and axioms. 
From around 1990 there were, however, some few who acknowledged the need for a common framework 
of high-generality terms, axioms, and definitions which would promote ontology reusability by building 
ontologies in a way that would ensure correspondence to the things and processes in reality they were 
designed to represent. Thus they embraced the need for just one agent/action ontology, just one software 
ontology, and so forth, and they started to ask questions like: ‘What is an object/process/attribute/relation? 
What is a transaction, a person, an organization? How do they depend on each other? How are they 
related?’ (Smith and Welty, 2001)  
It was in this way that early examples of top-level ontologies began to be developed with the goal of 
unifying and systematizing development of domain ontologies at lower levels, though at first with little 
traction in the broader world of KR scientists in general or of ontology developers in particular.  
In the year 1993 Tom Gruber published the first credible attempt at defining what an ontology – in the 






An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, 
where an ontology is a systematic account of Existence. For knowledge-based systems, what “exists” is 
exactly that which can be represented. When the knowledge of a domain is represented in a declarative 
formalism, the set of objects that can be represented is called the universe of discourse. This set of objects, 
and the describable relationships among them, are reflected in the representational vocabulary with which 
a knowledge-based program represents knowledge. (Gruber 1993) 
Gruber’s definition was rapidly adopted in multiple sub-fields of computer science. The definition still, of 
course, leaves open what a ‘conceptualization’ might be, and how the crucial sentence ‘For knowledge-
based systems, what “exists” is exactly that which can be represented’ is to be interpreted.11 What can be 
said with certainty, however, is that the vast majority of those following in Gruber’s footsteps assumed 
that his definition meant that an ontology is a representation not of entities in reality but of concepts. 
represented  
In the same year, however, there was held the first International Workshop on Formal Ontology in 
Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation in Padua, which brought together ontologists such 
as Gruber from the computer science field with philosophers embracing a more traditional approach to the 
understanding of the meaning of “exists”.12  
 
3.1 The case of SNOMED 
The dominance of what is sometimes referred to in terminology circles as the ‘concept orientation’ made 
itself manifest especially in the rapidly expanding field of medical terminology research, which is also the 
field in which the problems associated with concept-based approaches have been deliberated upon most 
persistently. The immediate need of medical terminologists was to address the problems raised by the 
huge numbers of synonymous and quasi-synonymous terms in the various medical disciplines. This 
problem is of minor importance where only humans are involved in the application of medical terms. 
Human experts in any given field know full well how to handle synonymy. When computers enter the 
 
11 This sentence is, for someone with a background in philosophical ontology, deeply problematic. 
12 This event served as the launchpad for the subsequent FOIS (Formal Ontology in Information Systems, 
https://iaoa.org/index.php/fois/fois-history/) conference series, which remains the premier event in ontology (science). Its 
organizers, Nicola Guarino and Roberto Poli, describe the meeting as ‘probably the first interdisciplinary initiative in this area, 
aiming to explore the connections between philosophers belonging to the tradition of Brentano and Husserl, philosophers of 
language, and people working on principles of knowledge representation and engineering.’ (Guarino and Poli 1995, p. 624). 






picture, however, matters are different.  
The (for a long time) most influential solution to the problem of how computers are to handle synonymy 
was presented by Cimino in his classic paper on “Desiderata for Controlled Medical Vocabularies in the 
Twenty-First Century” (1998). Cimino’s thesis is that, in the medical domain, 
most systems that report using controlled vocabulary are actually dealing with the notion of 
concepts. Authors are becoming more explicit now in stating that they need vocabularies in which 
the unit of symbolic processing is the concept – an embodiment of a particular meaning. Concept 
orientation means that terms must correspond to at least one meaning (“nonvagueness”) and no 
more than one meaning (“nonambiguity”), and that meanings correspond to no more than one term 
(“nonredundancy”).  
The definition of ‘concept’ here provided – as ‘an embodiment of a particular meaning’ – is, however, 
difficult to parse. Embodied in what?  Moreover, to understand this definition, we would need to 
understand already the meaning of the term ‘meaning’, which philosophers have long recognized as a 
difficult nut to crack.  
The central problem not addressed by Cimino, however, is that the meaning of the word ‘concept’ itself 
varies drastically from one community to the next (and sometimes from one paragraph to the next). 
Certainly, there are acceptable and scientifically well-defined uses of this term, for instance in the study 
of conceptual change in developmental psychology (Carey 2009). But constructing a medical terminology 
– for example a gargantuan terminology such as SNOMED CT13 – is not an exercise in empirical 
psychology. 
Unfortunately, SNOMED CT is itself pervaded (quite literally from top to bottom) by the concept 
orientation, as is seen in the fact that SNOMED CT Concept is the topmost node of the entire SNOMED 
CT taxonomical hierarchy and thus subsumes the entire SNOMED CT universe. Thus we have:  
clinical finding is_a SNOMED CT Concept,  
 
13 Formerly known as the ‘Systematized Nomenclature for Medicine’, though this label has been dropped since the 
SNOMED International Organization no longer sees SNOMED as a nomenclature. ‘CT’ stands for ‘clinical terms’. The first 
versions of SNOMED were developed under the leadership of Roger A. Côté, originally under the name ‘Systematized 
Nomenclature of Pathology’ (SNOP). When Côté visited the Vatican to present to the Vatican Library a copy of the four 
volumes of what was then titled SNOMED International: The Systematized Nomenclature of Human and Veterinary 







environment or geographical location is_a SNOMED CT Concept, 
pharmaceutical product is_a SNOMED CT Concept, 
social context is_a SNOMED CT Concept, 
and many more. Given, therefore, the standard reading of is_a – the reading accepted in other concepts 
by SNOMED CT itself – it follows that when you are suffering from a headache than what you are 
suffering from is_a (is a) SNOMED CT Concept. 
The SNOMED CT community does indeed go to great lengths to explain what it means by ‘concept’, for 
example in its Editorial Guide from 201814, where we read:  
(5) SNOMED CT concepts should name classes of things.  
(6) A concept is defined as a clinical idea to which a unique concept identifier has been assigned. 
Concepts are associated with descriptions that contain human-readable terms describing the 
concept. 
(7) A term is defined as a human-readable phrase that names or describes a concept. 
We note that in (5) concepts are identified as names, while in (6) they are identified as clinical ideas and 
explicitly distinguished from terms. In (7), terms are identified as names or descriptions of concepts.15 
Thus the term ‘Myocardial Infarction’ (for example) describes not myocardial infarction (the clinical 
phenomenon that appears in certain patients) but rather the concept Myocardial Infarction. Terms in 
medical terminologies à la Cimino, are about Cimino’s ‘embodied meanings’. 
Already in 2010 SNOMED CT had responded to criticisms concerning the problems created by such 
ambiguities in its use of the term, by publishing as the Glossary entry for ‘Concept’ in its Technical 
Reference Guide the following warning:  
Concept 




15 Friends of the concept orientation can of course criticize those who use the term ‘term’ as an alternative to ‘concept’ by 
pointing out that the term ‘term’, too, can be misused in a way that involves a blurring of the distinction between ‘entities of 
the domain’ and ‘entities of language’. This occurs, for example, when (Bauer et al. 2008) describe a new software tool 
called Ontologizer as ‘a Java application that can be used to perform statistical analysis for overrepresentation of Gene 






 a clinical idea to which a unique ConceptId has been assigned;  
 the ConceptId itself, which is the key of the Concepts Table (in this case it is less ambiguous to use the 
term “concept code”);  
 the real-world referent(s) of the ConceptId, that is, the class of entities in reality which the ConceptId 
represents (in this case it is less ambiguous to use the term “meaning” or “code meaning”) 
But as (Ceusters 2011) notes, merely pointing out this problem does not imply that the problem has been 
solved. Indeed, the very same Glossary still contains, for example, an assertion to the effect that a 
SNOMED CT term is ‘a text string that represents the Concept’.16 
So what is it then that is represented by a term: (1) the clinical idea, (2) less likely, but nevertheless in line 
with the expressed ambiguity – the ConceptID, or (3) the real-world referent(s)? The same question must 
then be asked for the several hundred occurrences of the word ‘concept’ throughout the SNOMED CT 
documentation. In some cases, readers can infer from the context which meaning is intended, but in most 
cases, only the SNOMED CT authors can provide the answer by rewriting the entire documentation. 
(Ceusters 2011; see also section 2.1 of Ceusters 2021) 
 The most recent SNOMED CT documentation reveals no advance on this front, suggesting now that 
‘concept’ and ‘term’ are interchangeable, and introducing an entirely new characterization of concepts as 
‘clinically relevant thoughts’: 
Concepts, or terms, are represented by unique codes and human readable descriptions. Each concept is a 
unique clinically relevant thought, across a wide range like abscess, zygote, measurement procedure, 
or substance, as examples. (https://www.imohealth.com/ideas/article/snomed-ct-101-a-guide-to-the-
international-terminology-system/) 
Curing an abscess, then, means curing a clinically relevant thought.  
Attempts have been made to define the term ‘concept’ (and related terms such as ‘conceptualization’ or 
‘conceptual entity’) also in other medical terminology circles. But these attempts, too, have been 
unconvincing. Yet in spite of all the problems,17 there is still, after more than 20 years of concept-oriented 
ontology and terminology research in medicine and in other fields, no definition of ‘concept’ that can be 




17 See for example (Ceusters, Smith, Kumar, Dhaen, 2004 and 2004a), (Bodenreider et al. 2007), (Bona et al. 2019), 






be used at all. 
3.2 Defending the concept orientation 
What, then, is to be said in favor of Cimino’s idea that vocabularies should be development in which the 
unit of symbolic processing is the concept? A number of arguments to support this view have been 
proposed, and these arguments are discussed extensively in (Smith, Kusnierczyk and Ceusters 2006). Here 
we offer some examples of these arguments in abbreviated form.  
First is what we might call the argument from intellectual modesty, which can be summarized as follows: 
It is medical domain experts who must answer for the truth of whatever theories the medical terminology 
is intended to mirror. Since domain experts themselves will sometimes disagree, any given terminology 
should embrace no claims as to what the world is like, but reflect, rather, some abstract conceptual 
substitute derived, somehow, from the different concepts used by different experts.  
Against this, however, it can be pointed out that communities of experts working on common domains in 
the medical as in other scientific fields in fact accept a massive and ever-growing body of consensus truths 
about the entities in these domains. Where conflicts do arise in the course of scientific development, these 
are highly localized, and pertain in medicine primarily to specific mechanisms, for example of drug action 
or disease development. But the latter can serve as the targets of conflicting beliefs only against the 
background of a large body of shared presuppositions.  
Moreover, we can think of no scenario under which it would make sense to postulate special entities called 
‘concepts’ as the entities to which terms subject to scientific dispute would refer. For either, for any such 
term, the dispute is eventually resolved in favour of one side or the other, and then it is the corresponding 
real-world entity that has served as its referent all along. Or it is ultimately established that the term in 
question is non-designating, and then this term is no longer a candidate for inclusion in whatever is the 
active version of the relevant terminology.  
The proposal from SNOMED and other defenders of the concept approach, however, is much more 
radical. It is that we provide guaranteed referents called ‘concepts’ not only for terms identified as 
problematic but for every single term in the terminology. The realist alternative solution is in contrast 
more modest. It is simply to treat any terminology as subject to a process of evolution (Smith 2006 and 
2008). Even terms still subject to dispute can be incorporated into the terminology alongside other terms 






subject to dispute and thereby treated logically as unavailable for use in certain sorts of inferences.18 
Another argument in favor of the concept orientation is the argument from negative findings. Consider, 
for example, the case where a clinician reports a finding of ‘absent nipple’. The defender of the concept 
orientation will argue that there is no real-world entity denoted by this expression, and therefore that the 
expression must refer to something like a concept. Certainly clinicians need to record such findings. But 
from the realist point of view, their findings are precisely that a nipple is absent; not that a special kind of 
(‘absent’, conceptual) nipple is present (Ceusters, Elkin, Smith 2007). 
Next is the argument from hypertension. The subject-matters of biology and medicine are, it is held, 
replete with entities which do not exist in reality but are rather convenient fictions, as in the case of the 
entities designated by expressions such as ‘hypertension’ or ‘obesity’ or ‘abnormal curvature of spine’. 
Such abstractions are, it is held, ‘mere concepts’, since they reflect not joints in reality but rather certain 
more or less arbitrary human decisions (which may indeed vary over time).  
From the realist point of view, in contrast, such terms are analogous to, for example, ‘Poland’ or ‘the 
middle ages’. That is, they represent full-fledged entities in the real world, but they are entities whose 
boundaries are precisely the results of decisions made by human beings. The metre, the kilogram, and the 
second, too, are the results of fiat demarcations of this sort, and so also is hypertension, which rests on a 
(periodically readjusted) fiat threshold established by consensus among physicians. 
Finally, we can mention what we might call the argument from administration, which asserts that, for 
many of the purposes for which medical terminologies are devised, a focus on something like Aristotelian 
universals would be far too restrictive. Consider the ICD (International Classification of Diseases) term: 
(8) Tuberculosis of adrenal glands, tubercle bacilli not found (in sputum) by microscopy, but 
found by bacterial culture. 
There is no ontological difference between tuberculosis diagnosed by microscopy and tuberculosis 
diagnosed by bacterial cultural, any more than there is such a difference between tuberculosis diagnosed 
on a Wednesday and tuberculosis diagnosed on a Thursday, or while wearing socks. For the 
administrative purposes of the ICD and its many users, however, it is important that differences such as 
those expressed in (8) should be accounted for terminologically.  
 






Perhaps, then, a term like (8) should be acknowledged as representing a concept? But no, and yet again 
no. (8) is about tuberculosis; indeed it is about tuberculosis of adrenal glands (and thus it is also about 
glands) and similarly it is also about sputum (Ceusters and Smith 2015). Wherever (8) occurs in any 
document prepared by some clinician user of ICD, we can be sure that the author of this document is quite 
clear in her mind that that is what this term is about. She is not using this term to refer to, for example, 
someone’s clinical thought.  
Combination terms like (8) involve the mixing together of properly ontological terms (representing 
universals in the domains of disease, anatomy, and species taxonomy) with epistemological terms relating 
to how particular instances of a disease were discovered to exist, a matter of how, in this case, ‘reality is 
perceived, measured, and understood by health professionals.’ (Bodenreider et al. 2004) Manipulation of 
such combinations is an indispensable part of information driven medical research and so there is certainly 
no objection to developing ontologies whose terms would capture distinctions such as that between a 
bacterial culture test and a microscopy assay. Such ontologies are indeed already being developed (see 
for example (Bandrowski 2017, Gurcan 2017)). 
Needed, too, are ontological resources which allow the representation of what we might think of as 
administrative aspects of medical or scientific discourse. Consider a term such as: 
(9) subject in clinical trial SwEaTB for Diagnosing of Acute Tuberculosis  
Here we have a term that is not intended to represent a universal or the extensions of a universal (in 
anything like the Aristotelian sense). Rather, it is intended to capture what we can think of as a 
convenience combination (also called ‘defined classes’ (Arp et al. 2015)). We then need to distinguish 
two kinds of ontologies; what we might call ‘reference ontologies’, on the one hand (dealt with in sections 
4–6 below), which are designed to be of global reach and application neutral and thus to capture universals, 
together with, on the other hand, ‘application ontologies’, which result from the combination of terms 
from reference ontologies together with terms such as (9) developed for local, application-specific 
purposes (Shaw et al. 2008). Building this sort of bridge between application ontologies and reference 
ontologies is by no means a trivial matter (Schulz et al. 2021). Experience strongly suggests, however that 
it is the only course that will avoid the sort of destructive proliferation witnessed in the ontology field in 






4 The Foundational Model of Anatomy 
From around 2013 there has been occurring a paradigm shift in biomedical terminology and ontology 
development circles (Schulz et al. 2013) away from the concept orientation. Attempts have since then 
been made by for example to create an ontologically robust upper-level structure for SNOMED CT 
(Schulz et al. 2015). The first biomedical ontology to be developed in the spirit of ontological realism, 
however, came much earlier. This was the Foundational Model of Anatomy (Rosse and Mejino 2003), 
which addresses the need for a generalizable anatomy ontology that could be used and adapted by any 
computer-based application that requires anatomical information. The FMA is a domain ontology that 
represents a coherent body of explicit declarative knowledge about human anatomy. It has the potential 
for enabling many digital applications involving reference to and manipulation of information about 
anatomical entities, for instance in educational applications, particularly in the domain of distance 
learning, and as the basis for computer models, for example in the area of human anatomical development. 
Its ontological framework can be applied and extended to all other species, and it provides the template 
for CARO (the Common Anatomy Reference Ontology) (Haendel et al. 2008) and much of the content 
for the UBERON integrated cross-species anatomy ontology (Mungall et al. 2012).  
4.1 The FMA as a canonical ontology 
The FMA is very large, comprising some 120,000 terms and over 2.1 million assertions of relationships 
between the entities represented by these terms. Yet for all its size, it addresses only what we can 
provisionally think of as the normal healthy human being. This is because the attempt to do justice to, for 
example, all possible types of variants and pathologies affecting human anatomy would lead to an 
explosion in size which would make the result unmanageable and probably also of little utility.  
Rather, the strategy of the FMA is to constitute a canonical ontology, ranging over types (universals) 
which are in a sense idealizations of the human organism’s body and of its component parts. More 
precisely, the FMA represents all material objects, all portions of substance, and all spaces that result from 
the coordinated expression of the structural genes of the human organism (in a good approximation: all 
parts of a normally developed human body, from the macromolecular to macroscopic levels of 
granularity). 
Canonical anatomy is thus distinct from instantiated anatomy, which comprises anatomical data about 
individual organisms. though it does not itself comprise such data, the FMA serves as a valuable 






vocabulary for describing those ways in which instantiated anatomical structures can depart from what is 


















4.2 Canonical relations 
To capture the meanings of its terms in a computer parsable form, the FMA ontology, like the other 
biomedical ontologies which have followed in its wake, consists primarily of statements of the form ‘A 
rel B’, where ‘rel’ stands in for a relational expression such as ‘constitutional_part_of ’, 
‘has_regional_part’, ‘is_member_of ’, ‘is_tributary_of ’, and most importantly ‘is_a’ (meaning either: is 
a subtype of, or is a subclass of), which is the relation used to determine the backbone taxonomy of every 
ontology. The upper part of the FMA backbone taxonomy is represented in Figure 5. (‘Anatomical Space’, 
here, refers to the sorts of channels and cavities referred to in section 1.3 above.) 
The now standard way of defining part_of and other such relations between types in ontologies is by 
reference to the relations that hold between the corresponding instances of these types, and using the FOL 
device of quantification. Two major types of definitions are then required, for relations between types of 






former we have: 
X has_part Y =def. for any instance x of the process type X there is some instance y of the process 
type Y which is such that y instance-level-part-of x.  
Example: Development of Spleen has_part Development of Splenic Lobules. 
For the latter, however, we need to take account of time, in order to do justice to the fact that objects can 
gain and lose parts while preserving their identity:  
X has_part Y =def. for any time t and for any instance x of the object type X at t, there is some 
instance y of the object type Y at t which is such that y instance-level-part-of x at t.  
Example: Set of Teeth has_part Left Maxillary Dentition. 
On the basis of a set of definitions modelled on the above, a group of leaders of different groups of 
biomedical ontology developers, including not only the FMA and Gene Ontologies but also the GALEN 
group around Alan Rector, developed the Relation Ontology (RO) (Smith, Ceusters et al. 2005). This 
provides a basis for the formal definition of the relations used by biomedical ontology developers in a way 
that promotes interoperability of the ontologies which use them and thereby allows new types of 
automated reasoning both within and across ontologies.19 
In some domains, universal parthood assertions of the above-mentioned sort are unproblematic. This holds 
for example of relations between molecules and their parts in chemistry. It also holds for certain 
anatomical relations, such as: Neuron has_constitutional_part Plasma Membrane.20 In biology in general 
and in medicine in particular, however, such universal assertions are problematic because there are 
variants (for example some humans have a middle lobe of left lung) and pathologies (for example tumors, 
or missing teeth). Many assertions of relations in the FMA hold, therefore, as a matter of canonical 
ontology.  
This means that an FMA statement such as: 
(1) Skin of Thumb has_regional_part Nail of Thumb 
 
19 The current version of the Relation Ontology can be found at http://www.obofoundry.org/ontology/ro.html. An expanded 
set of upper-level relations, developed to deal with the problem documented in (Grewe 2016), is provided in part 2 of 
(ISO/IEC 21838 2021).  
20 The two main types of part in FMA are: constitutional parts, which are genetically determined, as in: Hand 
has_constitutional_part Skeleton of Hand; and regional parts, where the part entities are the results of fiat delineation using 






is not an empirical assertion. Thus it is not falsified by the existence of human thumbs from which the 
nail has been removed. Rather, it is a statement that expresses how Nail of Thumb and Skin of Thumb 
are supposed to relate to each other in virtue of the workings of the underlying structural genes of the 
human organism.  
4.3 Aristotelian definitions 
A further crucial contribution of the FMA to the subsequent development of biomedical ontologies is in 
the field of definitions. The goal of a dictionary definition is to provide an explanation of the meaning of 
an expression that is useful to humans. In the ideal case, the dictionary provides an explanation that is 
built out of terms that are more familiar and simpler in meaning than the term to be defined. Often, 
however, dictionary definitions will amount to mere paraphrases, and they may be circular, either directly, 
or indirectly (as when term A is defined using term B, but term B is defined using term A). Often, too, 
multiple, mutually inconsistent definitions are provided for a single term. 
To reach the goal of providing a tool to support logical reasoning, FMA requires a set of logically 
consistent definitions, with at most one definition for each term, and structured in such a way that each 
definition provides a statement of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the correct 
application of the term defined (Köhler et al. 2006, Seppälä et al. 2017). To address these needs, Rosse 
and his collaborators introduced the idea of what, drawing on the background discussed above in 1.2, they 
called ‘Aristotelian definitions’.  
A definition of the form  
(2) S =def. a G which Ds, 
where S stands for species, G for genus, and D for differerentia(e), tells us that, if we know that something 
is a G which Ds, then we know that it is an S; and if we know that something is an S, then we also know 
that it is a G which Ds. Here G is the immediate parent of S in the backbone taxonomy of the salient 
ontology, and D is what sets those Gs which are Ss apart from the rest of the Gs. An example from the 
FMA ontology is: 
Anatomical structure [S] =def. Material anatomical entity [G] which is generated by coordinated 






its parts are connected and spatially related to one another in patterns determined by coordinated gene 
expression [D] (Rosse and Mejino 2007) 
where     mark out the collection of sufficient conditions that forms the salient specific difference. Together, G 
and D specify the essential characteristics of any S. And a ‘group of entities that share the same set of 
essential characteristics constitutes a class of the ontology’ (Michael et al. 2001), 
5 The Gene Ontology (GO) 
5.1 Background  
In 1977 Frederick Sanger and his collaborators sequenced the first full genome, that of a virus called 
phiX174. Since that point, the biological and biomedical sciences have been subjected to a process of 
upheaval as a result of the need to take account of the gigantic amounts of molecular assay data that have 
been generated in the wake of the successful completion of the human and the various fly, mouse, fish, 
yeast and other model organism genome projects. Practically all aspects of what we might call ‘old 
biology’ were destined to be transformed as biologists and clinical scientists worked out how to take 
account of these new data in dealing scientifically not only with the many new kinds of entity being 
disclosed at the molecular (and finer) levels through the advance of science, but also with all the already 
recognized phenomena at coarser levels of granularity (cell, tissue, organ, organism, population) upon 
which biology and medicine had hitherto been based. (Kumar et al. 2004)  
But how to make the gigantic quantities of new data discoverable and usable by biologists in a situation 
where the primary source data lived in many independently developed biological databases? How to 
transform these many efforts into a single cooperative force? Among the very earliest repositories for the 
new data, created already in the 1970s, were the first protein structure database (Protein Data Bank, 
https://www.rcsb.org/pages/pdb50/) and the first mammalian genetics database (created at the Mouse 
Genome Informatics (MGI) resource of the Jackson Lab, http://www.informatics.jax.org/). These were 
followed in 1981 by the first depository for nucleotide sequences, established in 1981 at the European 
Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) in Heidelberg (https://www.embl.org/about/history/). Each of 
these contributed to the strategy of using molecular assay data deriving from model organisms to advance 
our understanding of human health and disease, the idea being that clinical scientists could harvest the 
results of experiments carried out on model organisms in order to draw conclusions relevant to humans 






similar between organisms is because of their descent from a common ancestor. When GO was founded, 
it was widely hypothesized (and is now supported by a great deal of evidence) that function is also 
generally conserved, so that an experiment that elucidates an aspect of the function of a gene in the mouse, 
or in yeast, could tell us about the function of related genes in humans. The GO made it possible to test 
this hypothesis computationally at large scale, and more importantly, to infer the functions of human genes 
by studying other, more experimentally tractable systems. It is this idea which provided initial impetus for 
the development of the GO. 
By the turn of the millennium the number of biological databases was reaching a level where it had become 
unmanageable. Attempts to create a federated system failed, not least because it was so hard to get the 
many groups involved to agree on how the data should be structured and labelled. The fear, too, was that 
such a federated system would create what Suzanna Lewis refers to as ‘a technological behemoth that 
would be unable to respond to new requirements when they inevitably occurred.’  
The most fundamental questions for the biologists served by the model organism databases revolved around 
the genes. … One essential aspect of this, which everyone agreed was necessary, was systematically 
recording the molecular functions and biological roles of every gene. (Lewis 2004, emphasis added) 
5.2 The origins of the GO 
In the 1990s, Michael Ashburner began assembling classifications of molecular functions and biological 
processes, originally to serve the requirements of FlyBase, the database for Drosophila genetics and 
molecular biology.  At around this time different model organism communities began to see that they 
could solve a significant portion of their data integration issues if a functional classification system were 
created that was cross-species in nature. The goal was to get the developers of databases focused on 
sequence (nucleic acid or protein) together with the developers of other specialty biological databases 
built for different ranges of organisms to agree on how this should be done in a way that would work for 
all organism communities.  
Lewis describes against this background how the GO came into being in 1998: 
In July of that year, Michael Ashburner presented a proposal at the Montreal International conference on 
Intelligent Systems for Molecular Biology (ISMB) bio-ontologies workshop to use a simple hierarchical 
controlled vocabulary; his proposal was dismissed by other participants as naïve. But later, in the hotel bar, 
representatives of FlyBase (me [Ashburner]), SGD [the Saccharomyces (yeast) Genome Database] (Steve 






to describe the molecular functions and biological roles for every gene in our respective databases. Thus 
we founded the Gene Ontology Consortium. (Lewis 2004; compare Ashburner 1998; Stevens 2013) 
Note that the vision was not to create a database covering all functions of all genes in all organisms. 
Rather – and here lay the brilliant insight of Ashburner, Lewis and their collaborators – it was to create a 
controlled vocabulary for representing types of molecular functions, and to use this vocabulary to annotate 
(or ‘tag’) occurrences of references to corresponding genes or gene products in literature or in data in such 
a way as to make the latter discoverable by third parties from different branches of biology.  
The GO became, in effect, an engine for searching in literature and data what was still mostly hidden to 
outsider communities because it was inadequately or inconsistently described. It was based on annotations 
created by human beings (PhD biologists), pioneers in the new discipline of biocuration. The GO itself 
was to a large degree populated through the work of such biocurators. The annotations themselves would 
then be compiled, in conjunction with the UniProt protein sequence repository (UniProt 2008), to form 
the GO Annotation database (GOA) (Camon et al. 2004),  Then came more sophisticated software tools 
such as the AmiGO browser  (http://amigo.geneontology.org/), which allowed a significant fraction of the 
world’s biological literature and data to be subjected to filtered search, allowing an investigator, for 
example studying the process of muscle development in Bos taurus (cow),  to find immediately all proteins 
documented as involved in this process, all the articles in which this involvement is documented, and the 
source and nature of the evidence which each of these articles provides.21 
The result was called ‘Gene Ontology’, not because it was an upshot of the work on ontologies growing 
out of the KR and other computer-associated disciplines in the preceding years, but merely because 
‘ontology’ was, in 1998, the word-du-jour. The KR ontologies were in many cases, as we saw, products 
of a view to the effect that for every different project a new ontology is needed. The more ontologies, after 
all, the better. But then the results, for all their bangs and whistles, proved (not surprisingly) useless as 
soon as their authors moved on to the next project. The GO, in contrast, resulted from the insight that a 
simple controlled vocabulary could unite the many sequence-data driven projects springing forth on all 
sides. It started out, not as a sophisticated computer artifact, but rather as just a simple directed acyclical 










graph are terms22 (again: nouns and noun phrases, albeit now associated with alphanumeric identifiers, 
definitions, URIs, and so forth), and its edges are relations (initially just is_a and part_of)23. 
The fact that the GO was developed and maintained primarily by experts in molecular biology led initially 
to a certain animosity between the GO community and the community of those who had been developing 
ontologies on the basis of their computer expertise. However, with the eventual adoption by the GO 
community of OWL as their ontology development language, and with the ever increasing numbers of 
powerful software tools and algorithms and research methodologies made possible by the existence of the 
GO and its sister ontologies, this animosity has now largely disappeared. 
Initially, too, there were sceptics on the biology side, above all Sydney Brenner, winner of the 2002 Nobel 
Prize for his discoveries concerning programmed cell death. In the same year Brenner published a paper 
entitled “Life sentences: Ontology recapitulates philology”, charging the GO Consortium with the desire 
to transform genomics into what he called ‘genamics’.  
To do serious theoretical work, Brenner held, 
the network we should be interested in is not the network of names but the network of the objects 
themselves. The language of these objects is not the Oxford Dictionary of Molecular Biology … 
but the language of molecular biology itself. [There the] objects have their own names: they are 
chemical names written in the language of DNA sequences and the arrangements of amino acids 
on protein surfaces. (Brenner 2001) 
What Brenner failed to see was that, even should we all of us become fluent in the language of chemical 
names, we would still need to connect what we can say in this language with what we need to say in all 
the languages of old biology, including, not least, the languages of clinical medicine. 
Since its inception, indeed, the GO has gone from strength to strength. It is today by far the world’s most 
successful scientific ontology, whether measured along the dimensions of number and variety of 
associated software applications; quantities of data and literature annotated using its terms; number, size 
and degree of utilization of major databases incorporating term; numbers of experiments performed with 
 
22 Stefan Schulz (personal communication) points out that ‘label’ is in some ways preferable to ‘term’ A text string such as 
‘Primary malignant neoplasm of lung (disorder)’, for example, would never be used by any human author of scientific text. In 
the end, however, he favors over ‘term’ the expression ‘representational unit’, whose advantages are outlined in (Smith, 
Kusnierczyk and Ceusters 2006).   






its aid, and so forth.  
There are multiple drivers of this success. One of the main ones is that the GO and the GO annotations 
are hand built by human curators, who use the scientific literature as a basis for their work. The result is 
an extract of biological knowledge captured using GO (and sister ontology) terms and relations, which 
has proved itself to be of tremendous utility.  
There have, to be sure, been a number of proposals to leave population of the GO to machine learning. The 
problem with this approach is that it is not possible to create an algorithm that can extract knowledge from 
scientific literature automatically (Landgrebe and Smith 2021). Algorithms can be used for the sort of 
approximative text translation that is made available by google translate, but they cannot achieve results 
with the sort of accuracy that is required for the scientific purposes of the GO (Landgrebe and Smith 
2021).  
One very fruitful application of GO is to what is called the enrichment analysis of gene (product) datasets. 
In intervention studies (for example genetic or pharmacological interventions) or time-series analyses, the 
GO can be used to obtain an overview of the cellular locations, functions and biological processes in which 
the gene products are involved in order to develop hypotheses about dependent variables or outcomes 
analysed in such experiments. The GO can also be used to classify and assess the status of independent 
variables in order to identify confounding effects (hidden co-variables). Powerful software applications 
have been developed for these purposes, including the GO-Figure! visualization tool developed by 
(Reijnders and Waterhouse 2021).24 
Another reason for the GO’s success is that it makes certain sorts of investigations possible that would 
just not be possible without it. The point is not just that genomic data is annotated with the same shared 
ontology, nor that this enables such data to be exchanged and integrated. Still more important is that the 
resulting huge and ever growing unified knowledge base about the functions of genes makes it possible 
to interpret large-scale measurements of gene expressions (or other -omics measurements) in relation to 
an unending series of biological phenomena. Examples of studies, selected at random from those 
published just in recent weeks, use the GO to identify pathways implicated in suicide behavior, breast 
cancer survival, autism spectrum disorders, involvement of calcium signaling in Schizophrenia,  
 
24 At the same time, care must be taken to avoid misuse of the GO annotation data, for example by failing to take account of 
the ontological structure of the GO itself, or by ignoring the evidence codes which provide information as to the methods by 






association signals of dental caries, disease modeling in C. elegans, and many more.  
 
5.3 The GO table of categories 
The three questions you want the answers to when you discover a new gene product or complex are:  
What does it do at the molecular level of granularity? 
To what downstream biological processes does it contribute? 
Where is it located in the cell? 









the original GO paper (Ashburner et al. 2000) as ‘The three categories of GO’ – are defined as follows: 
Molecular function =def. Biochemical activity (including specific binding to ligands or structures) of a 
gene product. This definition also applies to the capability that a gene product (or gene product complex) 
carries as a potential. Examples: ‘enzyme’, ‘transporter’, ‘ligand’. 
Biological process =def. Biological objective to which the gene or gene product contributes. A process is 
accomplished via one or more ordered assemblies of molecular functions. Processes often involve a 
chemical or physical transformation, in the sense that something goes into a process and something 
different comes out of it. Examples: ‘cell growth and maintenance’, ‘signal transduction’. 
Cellular component =def. Place in the cell where a gene product is active. Examples: ‘ribosome’, 
‘nuclear membrane’, ‘Golgi apparatus’. 
5.4 Function in the GO 
The GO has retained its original modular architecture and its general structure and methodology over its 
more than 20 year history. But it has been subject throughout this entire period to considerable revisions 
at lower levels. This is primarily a matter of the deprecation of terms deemed obsolete, revision of 
definitions, or addition of new terms and even of new families of terms, for example covering hitherto 
underrepresented domains, such as immunology (Diehl et al. 2007).  
The passage of time has seen also revisions to the original definitions of the three GO categories, and it is 
especially in connection with the GO’s definition of ‘function’ that controversy has arisen. The current 
definition of molecular function reads as follows:  
(10) Molecular function =def. molecular process that can be carried out by the action of a single 
macromolecular machine, usually via direct physical interactions with other molecular entities. 
Function in this sense denotes an action, or activity, that a gene product (or a complex) performs. 
(http://geneontology.org/, as of August 7, 2021) 
At the start, there was built into the GO world view the assumption that is_a relations can never span the 
boundaries between the three GO sub-ontologies. The functions at the (chemical) level of granularity of 
molecules in the GO thus stand in some way opposed both to the processes occurring at higher 
(‘biological’) levels of granularity and to the locations in the cell.  
Quite rightly, I believe, many of those who first encounter the GO are therefore confused by the fact that 






such as ‘ion channel regulator activity’, ‘regulation of lysozyme activity’, ‘ceramide floppase activity’, 
‘regulation of phosphatidate phosphatase activity’, and so on. 
The new definition of molecular function (10) tells us, indeed, that molecular function is_a molecular 
process. In normal usage, however, and also in the usage of many philosophers, functions are not a special 
type of process. Rather, they are certain sorts of historically grounded potentials or capabilities in things 
that can be realized in processes when suitable circumstances obtain. As the term ‘function’ is normally 
understood, a function can fail entirely to be realized; or it can be misrealized. A well-oiled machine, for 
example, will indeed perform its function in normal circumstances; but when things go wrong then it can 
behave (act) in all sorts of non-functional – or, as we might also say, non-canonical – ways. 
In a sense, the functions of the macromolecular machines inside an organism are being continuously 
realized, just as the function of the organism’s heart is being continuously realized for so long as the 
organism is alive. But macromolecular machines change their activity patterns. For example, the sleeping 
brain is biochemically very active, but the pattern of activity differs from the wake pattern, and it differs 
again if one suppresses the normal rest pattern by taking sleeping pills or alcohol or both. Strictly speaking, 
of course, these latter cases are irrelevant to the GO. The GO, too, is a canonical ontology, and the scope 
of its Molecular Function ontology is determined by those molecular level processes that that the organism 
evolved to perform because it allowed the organism to better survive and reproduce. This is the meaning 
of ‘canonical’ for molecular (and indeed for all) functions.  
The GO is canonical also in that it does not deal, for example, with processes which are induced 
experimentally. Unrealized functions at the molecular level are also out of scope. However, the cyclic 
nature of many activities in organisms means that the referent of ‘activity’ will even in many canonical 
cases differ from one phase to the next. The referent of ‘function’, in contrast, will always be the same. 
Defining precisely the meaning of the term ‘function’ is a non-trivial matter, and philosophers and others 
have proposed various alternative definitions. In the Gene Ontology Handbook, Paul Thomas provides an 
account of the GO’s usage of ‘function’ according to which it is the standard etiological or ‘selected effect’ 
definition of function that is intended by the GO. We believe that his arguments for this interpretation – 
an interpretation which we also defend (Spear et al. 2016) – are sound. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the 
strength of his arguments is diminished by the fact that he adopts the terminological convention at work 
already in the original GO definition of ‘molecular function’ provided in 5.3 previous section of this 






one hand, and its corresponding activity (realization/execution/performance) on the other. 
In a simplified version of the selected effect account (based on Millikan (1989), which Thomas also cites), 
a function is defined as follows: 
(11) A has function F =def. A originated as a reproduction (for instance as offspring, or as copy) 
of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of the properties reproduced, have 
actually performed F in the past, and A exists because (causally historically because) of this or 
these performances.  
It is, very briefly, the function of my heart to pump blood because my ancestors’ hearts’ pumping blood 
through their bodies kept them alive and because I exist because of this. We note that, according to this 
definition, it would still be the function of my heart to pump blood even if (for example because I am 
connected to a heart-lung machine) it is currently unable to do so. It would still be the function of my 
screen to display pixels even if (for example because my machine is switched off) it is currently unable to 
do so. 
As Thomas correctly points out, it is an advantage of the selected effect approach that it explicitly 
incorporates evolutionary considerations by requiring that the function of any biological entity ultimately 
derives from its history of natural selection. The approach thereby provides a method for determining 
which – among the myriad potential alternative effects the actions of a particular entity might have – are 
properly to be considered as the exercise of its function. One effect of my heart pumping, for example, is 
to produce sound; but this is not a part of the function of my heart, because this effect was not selected 
for.  
The terminology of the GO has been built in such a way as to do justice to the selected effect account of 
function, but in a way that most subtypes of ‘function’ are labelled ‘activity’. This is not because Thomas 
and others fail to appreciate the difference between function and activity, but rather because, in the 
canonical world of the GO, function and activity go so tightly hand-in-hand with each other that it would 
be terminologically redundant to provide representations of both (thus both to catalyize and catalytic 
activity, both to regulate and regulating activity, and so forth – compare also the function and process 
columns in Table 1). The simplest would be to rename the GO ‘molecular function’ ontology, and to call 
it instead the ‘molecular activity ontology’ or – following a practice which I understand is already favored 






molecular ‘activity’/‘functioning’ is meant ‘the exercise of a function of a macromolecular machine’, and 
providing as part of its glossary a suitable definition of ‘function’. 
It is important to keep both ‘activity’ and ‘function’ in circulation, however. For it might, certainly be the 
case that in the canonical world of the GO it is trivial that any activity of Xing that is realized under a 
particular set of conditions (which is in practice how evidence to assert that a gene product is an instance 
of a given GO class is obtained) is also the realization of a function: to X, But this is no longer true when 
GO is being used in those areas where there are departures from what is canonical. There are multi-cellular 
systems in my heart which have the function to contract. This function remains one and the same even 
under those non-canonical conditions where my heart is not functioning very well, and where contraction 
activities therefore depart from the canonical. 
Thomas summarizes his account of molecular function in two places, as follows: 
(12) In the GO, a molecular function is a process that can be carried out by the action of a single 
macromolecular machine, via direct physical interactions with other molecular entities. Function in 
this sense denotes an action, or activity, that a gene product performs. 
(13) A function as conceived by molecular biologists (in what could be called the ‘molecular biology 
paradigm’) refers to specific, coordinated activities that have the appearance of having been designed 
for a purpose. That apparent purpose is their function.  
To do justice to the ontological distinction between function and the processes/activities that realize 
them, these would need to be amended to read 
(13) In the GO, a molecular function *is realized in* a process that can be carried out by the action of a 
single macromolecular machine, via direct physical interactions with other molecular entities. “This 
realization is* an action, or activity, that a gene product performs. 
(14) A function as conceived by molecular biologists (in what could be called the ‘molecular biology 
paradigm’) *is used where* specific, coordinated activities have the appearance of having been 
designed for a purpose. That apparent purpose is their function.  
5.5 Extending the GO 
Interestingly, in elucidating his account of function, Thomas draws on Jacques Monod’s idea in Chance 
and Necessity (1971) of teleonomy. This Monod defines as ‘the characteristic of objects endowed with a 






their performances’ (p. 9). This applies to artifacts such as screwdrivers, which are designed to have a 
certain purpose. For living systems, however, we cannot talk of design. Rather, as Thomas writes, ‘what 
appears to be a future-goal-oriented action by a living organism is, in fact, only a blind repetition of a 
genetic program that evolved in the past.’ More completely, however – for there are two series of blind 
repetitions here – he should write:  
1. the program is copied over and over again through (blind) biological processes of copying the 
relevant entity (for instance the relevant macromolecular machine)  
2. the execution of each copy of the program is repeated in the successive realizations of that 
entity’s function.  
Teleonomy, for Monod, is present at all levels of a biological system, from proteins (which he calls ‘the 
essential molecular agents of teleonomic performance’) to ‘systems providing large scale coordination 
of the organism’s performances … [such as] the endocrine and nervous systems’ (op. cit., p. 62). At all 
levels, indeed, we have objects, and systems and parts of objects, performing (activities) which realize 
apparent purposes (functions), such as pumping blood, regulating chemical levels in the blood, removing 
damaged cells from the blood, and so forth. And in each of these cases we have to deal, not only with 
functions of the body involving groups of cells interacting via molecules or ions, but also with functions 
of parts of the body at higher levels of granularity than molecules, which we might therefore call 
biological functions. And interestingly, although Thomas’s (2019) paper deals almost exclusively with 
functions at the molecular level, its title is “The Gene Ontology and the Meaning of Biological 
Function”, though by this he means not the functions of organs such as heart or lungs, but rather of 
systems of macromolecular machines, which Monod sees as analogues of cybernetic systems, thereby 
reflecting the way in which biologists today conceptualize the feedback loops constructed from multiple 
molecular activities. 
Table 1 depicts, on this basis, the GO architecture extended in such a way that an explicit division is drawn 
between levels of granularity along the vertical axis and kinds of entity along the horizontal, where the 














































6 The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry 
6.1 The birth of OBO  
As we learn from the subtitle of the landmark paper (Ashburner et al. 2000), the GO was originally 
conceived as a ‘tool for the unification of biology’. In other words, the GO was built to foster the melding 
together of biological data sets and techniques across disciplines, across levels of granularity in the 
organism, across species, and across geographically dispersed communities of originators and compilers 
of data and of researchers using these data. An example of success in this regard is the way in which the 
GO enables communication across all the disciplines collaborating for example in a field such as aging 
research, which involves the study of model systems of human aging in organisms as diverse as yeast, 
 
25 Thomas now describes how own position as follows: 
… of course for GO it’s all ultimately at the level of molecules. It’s the Gene ontology—it’s a conceptualization of 
how genes (technically, gene products, which are Molecule types that are encoded by genes) function at the molecular 
level, and at the system level. Essentially, the system level for molecular biologists is conceptualized as a highly 
integrated, coordinated execution of individual molecular activities. So in GO, the system level (biological process) 
is also represented in terms of gene products and their activities/functions. GO was not constructed for describing the 
functions of higher-order objects like the heart, though of course in practice it is natural to describe some biological 
programs in terms of higher order objects. For example, GO describes the genetic programs (BP), carried out by the 
activities of gene products (MF), that result in heart contraction. GO also describes the genetic programs, carried out 
by the activities of gene products, that result in the construction of the higher-order objects themselves (e.g. heart 
development). But GO biological processes also include subcellular processes: genetic programs that transmit a 
message (in the form of molecules of a given type) from outside a single cell to the cell nucleus (e.g. the Wnt signaling 


















reptiles and whales.  
Already in 2001, the trail laid by the GO opened the way for the creation of a series of controlled, cross-
species vocabularies for neighbouring areas of biology by proposing the creation of a public ontology 
repository, originally (we imagine for a very short time) referred to as ‘GOBO’, for ‘Global Open 
Biomedical Ontologies’ (Ashburner and Lewis 2003), and subsequently dubbed the ‘OBO Library’.  
The rules for building ontologies for this library can be found in a tutorial presented by Ashburner and 
Lewis at the Intelligent Systems for Molecular Biology (ISMB) conference in 2005 on “Principles of 
Biomedical Ontology Construction” (http://bit.ly/2GUkpoh). Most important are that the ontology must 
be shared without limit, and thus that it must be in the public domain and easily findable;26 that it is used 
in application to actual instances of important scientific data; and that it is maintained in such a way that, 
where such application leads to identification of errors and gaps, the latter will be promptly rectified.  
In the case of the GO, this strategy produced a positive snowball effect, making the GO increasingly 
attractive to successive cohorts of new users, who themselves identify new errors and gaps, giving rise to 
a regimen of continual improvement of a sort that was unknown to ontologies before the GO. 
6.2 The birth of the OBO Foundry  
The OBO Foundry was first conceived at a meeting held in Leipzig in 2004 on the topic of The Formal 
Architecture of the GO. Other groups from the KR and OWL communities had attempted earlier to interest 
the GO community in the benefits of a more ambitious approach to ontology development, especially as 
concerns the treatment of logic and definitions. Where these earlier efforts had failed,27 some of the new 
arguments presented at this meeting drawing on the perspective of ontological realism met with greater 
success.28 
No less important was the introduction of new rules to promote coordinated ontology development, the 
idea being that ontologies would be admitted as members of the Foundry initiative only if their developers 
 
26 The OBO community here anticipates the modern FAIR approach (Wilkinson et al. 2016) 
27 One member of the OWL community remarked to me at the time that ‘a meeting on the formal architecture of the GO? 
Well … that would have to be a very short meeting, then’. 
28 These included arguments in a presentation by the author entitled “STOP!” (for: Smart Terminologies through Ontological 
Principles – http://ontology.buffalo.edu/04/STOP_GO_5_04.ppt), illustrating how the realist perspective can help in the 








had committed in advance to certain principles, for example relating to working within set boundaries (for 
example of proteins or cell types) and agreeing to collaborate on those terms which relate to entities in 
areas where boundaries overlap. 
The details of Foundry organization were then worked out in a series of meetings, some of them under the 
auspices of the then newly established National Center for Biomedical Ontology (NCBO).29 Building the 
Foundry was viewed as amounting to distinguishing within the original OBO Library as a whole an inner 
compartment comprising, at any given stage, those ontologies certified to have satisfied both the Library 
principles and also a series of additional principles specific to the Foundry, designed to advance the quality 
and interoperability of its included ontologies  (Smith, Ashburner, et al. 2007).  
The core goal of the OBO Foundry – where ‘OBO’ is now understand as meaning ‘open biological and 
biomedical ontologies’ – like that of the OBO Library, is to create a situation where ontologies would 
support efficient knowledge accumulation in the life sciences by providing recommended sets of terms 
for annotating data in each life science domain – thus one set of terms for proteins (Chen et al. 2020), one 
set of terms for small molecules (or chemical entities of biological interest: Hastings 2012), one for plants 
(Cooper et al. 2018), and so forth. The terms in each ontology would be accompanied not only by natural 
language definitions designed to ensure that the terms are correctly used by those (humans) involved in 
creating annotations of biological literature and data, but also by formal definitions designed to promote 
computer-aided reasoning with the resulting annotated data.  
For the Foundry ontologies a layer of governance was introduced – in some ways analogous to the editorial 
board of a scientific journal – and a process of review was established which would certify conformance 
to the Foundry principles. The current set of principles includes the requirement to use a standard ontology 
language (currently OWL) and use of Basic Formal Ontology (see below) as shared top level. In fact BFO 
makes itself manifest already in the terminology used in the top two rows of Table 2, which depicts the 
initial structure proposed for the OBO Foundry, a structure which in effect extends Error! Reference 












In a parallel development, there arose at about the same time what would become a much larger biomedical 
ontology repository extending the original OBO Library idea, namely the NCBO BioPortal 
(https://bioportal.bioontology.org/), which provided the advantage of providing access to ontology-
structured versions of SNOMED CT, HL7, MeSH and other major resources from the world of medical 
terminology.  
The BioPortal adopted a very liberal strategy of acceptance of ontologies, which was in a sense at the 
opposite extreme from the strategy of the OBO Foundry.30 This, however, created for the BioPortal a 
problem of redundancy and lack of consistency between the (now of the order of) 500 ontologies listed, a 
problem which was further exacerbated as new ontologies were developed incorporating reuse of terms 
and definitions from multiple already established ontologies but supplying them with new term identifiers 
and new URIs. This conflicts with the OBO Foundry goal of creating a set of mutually consistent and non-
 
30 Later there arose the Ontobee portal (http://www.ontobee.org/) (Ong 2017), a biomedical ontology repository that is 
optimized for the purposes of the OBO Foundry using the technology of a linked data server. Ontobee is a linked ontology 








redundant ontologies for the life sciences that would promote for each term a unique recommended natural 
language definition, formal definition, and URI.31  
6.3 Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) 
BFO was adopted as required top level for ontologies in the Foundry in order to make available a 
common set of categories (highest-level universals) that would serve as the shared starting point for the 
definitions of lower-level universals included in the coverage domains of the separate biomedical 
ontologies in the Foundry. 
BFO itself was developed as a very small representational artifact with the narrowly focused task of 
providing an upper ontology which could be used to support the integration of domain ontologies 
developed for purposes of scientific research. As Tables 1 and 2 make clear, the structure of the set of 
ontology modules of the OBO Foundry is derived, in effect, by taking the cross-product of BFO’s top-
level categories with the multiple granular levels (of molecule, cell, organ, organism, population) relevant 
to biology. The FMA was the first extensively populated ontology to take advantage of the theoretical 
foundations of a top-level ontology and thereby extend the latter into the biomedical domain (Rosse, 
Kumar et al. 2005, Rosse and Mejino 2007).  
Adopting BFO allowed  
(i) the explicit formulation of aspects of the development methodology and architectural 
structure of the OBO Foundry (and other) ontologies in ways that have helped steer their 
subsequent development (Arp et al. 2015),  
(ii) providing a readily applicable technique for formulating definitions of terms in these 
ontologies (Seppälä 2017), 
(iii) formalizing relations (Smith, Ceusters, et al. 2005),  
(iv) supporting the strategy of cross-product definitions (Mungall 2011), whereby definitions in 
one OBO Foundry ontology will draw on terms defined already in other such ontologies, 
for example as GO terms whose definitions represent molecules draw on ChEBI definitions 
of those molecules, as described for example in (Hill et al. 2013),  
 
31 The most recent versions of the BioPortal go some way to solving this problem by generating search results in such a way 







(v) formally encoding the OBO Foundry principles as operational rules and applying the 
resultant checks across the full OBO suite of ontologies, thereby demonstrating how a 
sizable federated community can be organized and evaluated on objective criteria that help 
improve overall quality, interoperability and sustainability (Jackson 2021). 
6.4 The evolution of BFO 
There have been four releases of BFO thus far.32 Version 1 was released in 2001, and the influence of 
Aristotle’s table of categories on this first version can be seen in the similarity of terminology and 
structure as between the upper rows of Figure 2 and those of Figure 7. Another influence was the top-
level ontology DOLCE (Masolo et al. 2004). BFO shared with DOLCE from the very start a 
quadripartite architecture based on two orthogonal divisions of entities into disjoint categories of 1. 
continuant vs. occurrent and 2. independent vs. dependent. Material objects (Aristotle’s substances) are 
independent continuants; qualities are dependent continuants; and processes are occurrents. Entities in 
all of these categories exist on the level of both universals and instances (as in Error! Reference source 
not found.).33 
The release of BFO 1.1 in 2007 was prompted by the need to enable coverage of information artifacts, 
nucleotide sequences, and similar (copyable) entities, a need which arose with the birth of two new 
ontologies, the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) in 2006 (Bandrowski et al. 2016, Vita et 
al. 2021)34, and the Information Artifact Ontology (IAO; see Ceusters and Smith 2015), which provided 
terms used to represent entities such as publications, footnotes, protocols, databases, and so forth. 
The release of BFO 2 in 2015 reflects the transition from an OWL DL to an OWL 2 formalization, as 
well as the addition of term IDs and of temporalized relations. A preliminary version was released for 
review at the 2012 meeting of the International Conference on Biomedical Ontology. 
By the year 2020, BFO has come to serve as something of a stable attractor to ontology developers 
(http://basic-formal-ontology.org/users.html, Haller 2020), thereby giving rise to powerful network 
effects analogous to those brought by the QWERTY keyboard and the TCP/IP internet protocol, whereby 
 
32Successive versions are available through http://ontology.buffalo.edu/bfo.  
33 A further influence was lessons learned from work on a framework that would link the quantitative data studied in the new 
field of Geographic Information Science with qualitative data pertaining to the hills and valleys, rivers and lakes that form the 
subject-matter of what we might call old geography (Mark and Smith 2004; compare also Dolan et al. 2006). 
34 OBI is now an OBO Foundry ontology. It was created as a generalization of the Functional Genomics Investigation 






each successive new user BFO raises the value of the artifacts created on its basis by earlier users, in 
another positive feedback loop.  
As a consequence of these developments, the Joint Technical Committee on Information Technology (JTC 
1) of the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) have approved in 2021 the ISO/IEC 21838: Top-Level Ontologies (TLO) standard. Part 1 of this 
standard sets forth the requirements for being a top-level ontology. Part 2 documents BFO in a way that 
demonstrates satisfaction of these requirements.  
The release of BFO-2020 includes a more careful treatment of definitions. All non-primitive terms have 
been provided with English language definitions (which means: statements of individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions). All primitive terms have been provided with elucidations, which means: 
statements of necessary conditions together with specifications of examples of use. Additional 
improvements concern the logical formalization of BFO. Along with an OWL version of BFO-2020, the 
ISO standard provides also an axiomatization in common logic (BFO-2020-CL) and a translation thereof 
into FOL. A proof of consistency of BFO-2020-CL is provided, together with a proof that BFO-2020-
OWL is derivable therefrom. English-language definitions and elucidations provided in the standard are 
formulated in such a way as to be as close as possible to BFO-2020-CL while at the same time serving 










Like the Gene Ontology, and like the Planteome ontologies, which are seen by their developers as 
‘integrative tools for plant science’ (Walls et al. 2012), the OBO Foundry as a whole is a tool for the 
unification of biology. Indeed, all the OBO Foundry ontologies continue in their way the project of the 
Vienna circle to achieve the unification of science. They do this, however, not from the starting point of 
logic and philosophy, but rather from the starting point of biology and ontology. And they do this more 
successfully, because their project of unification is deeply interwoven, through multiple different sorts of 
multidirectional interactions, with ongoing developments in biology and, increasingly, in the clinical 
sciences.  
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